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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 153 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 12/08/1997 
Where it occurred: Jangalak, Ward 7, 
Kabul 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for clearance with explosive charge (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 





At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer since November 1995. It had been two months since the 
victim attended a revision course and 23 days since his last leave. The accident occurred on 
ground described as a riverbank that was hard, grassy and uneven.  
The investigators decided that the victim had got a reading with his detector and investigated 
it but found nothing. He swept the area again and still got a reading, so without remarking the 
spot, he squatted to prod again [presumed to have been wearing his helmet and visor]. 
The Section Leader stated that the victim marked the reading on both occasions and was 
working properly except that he had failed to get a precise detector reading and so prodded 
too hard in the wrong place. He blamed ground contamination with many fragments and the 
ground hardness and recommended that such sites be cleared with a back-hoe machine. 
The Project Supervisor stated the ground was unsuitable for prodding prone, so the victim 
was right to squat and was working properly. He recommended the use of explosive charges 
to investigate such readings. 
The victim stated that he was working properly – and cited his small injuries to support his 




The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the victim failed to mark the 
position accurately, so prodded onto the top of the mine. He was prodding in a squatting 
position and without wearing the "anti-fragment" jacket [this may be misleading because frag-
jackets were not provided - see “Analysis”]. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that all deminers must try to narrow down detector readings 
before starting to prod, that the Section Leader should be "strongly advised" because of his 
poor command and control, and that the anti-frag jacket should be worn when prodding in a 
squatting position. They added that field management should seriously consider the leave 
requirements of deminers. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 196 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 















See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as three fingers of his right hand amputated, his ear-
drum burst, and minor injuries to his right thigh, arms and neck.  
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) included lower right leg injuries. 
 
The demining group reported that the victim had sustained injuries to his right ring and middle 
fingers fractured and lacerated wounds to the right arm and superficial wounds to his right leg.  
A disability claim was forwarded to the insurers on 12th August 1997 (but only forwarded for 
processing on 22nd January 1998). In this the "disability" was given as "left ear total 
deafness", and "right ear 20-30% total hearing loss". 
No record of a compensation payment was found in June 1998. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because it seems likely that the 
victim was working properly (within the procedures of his group). If he was not marking his 
detector readings correctly, that would represent a “Field control inadequacy” because his 
error was not corrected. 
The investigator's claim that he should have been wearing a fragmentation jacket (if not 
working prone) must be seen in context. Two heavy NATO frag-jackets per team had been 
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issued some years before. Excavating in a squatting position was the norm, rather than an 
exception, so the jackets could not be used by everyone who needed them. As a result the 
jackets were very seldom worn (in any case, some were reported to have been 
commandeered by the Taliban forces).  
It is a serious management failing that the UN MAC had long been aware that squatting to 
prod was common but had not addressed protective needs adequately, preferring to insist 
that the deminers under their indirect control should lie prone. They knew this was ignored 
because the data in their own accident reports showed that they did not. A similarly blinkered 
ignorance about the adequacy of thin visors and short AK bayonets also prevailed. The hand 
damage suffered in this accident illustrates the risks associated with short handtools. 
The victim's severe deafness is common in Afghan claims at this time, when insurance 
favoured such injury and testing the validity of the claims was hard. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail was prevented by the UN 
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has 
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
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